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INTRODUCTION
C ORPORATE criminal enforcement has exploded in this country.Billion-dollar fines are now routine, where they were unimaginable
a decade ago, across a range of industries, from Big Pharma to the larg-
est megabanks to defense contractors and energy companies. We have
federal prosecutors and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), together
with the white-collar bar, to thank for this. Their innovations have trans-
formed what was, in decades past, a backwater area of criminal practice,
in which corporate enforcement was uncommon and any resulting fines
often quite minor, into a rapidly changing and exciting field of practice.'
Yet deep concerns remain. General Motors recently received an out-of-
court deferred prosecution agreement that permits the company to avoid
a conviction for concealing defects over many years-actions that cost
over a hundred people their lives-accompanied by no charges for any
employees. 2 We have seen major financial institutions like AIG, Bar-
* Justice Thurgood Marshall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School
of Law.
1 For an overview, see Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise
with Corporations 1-18 (2014).
2 David M. Uhlmann, Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2015, at
SR5, http://nyti.ms/lVlKzkq. For a report expressing concern with a wide range of recent
civil and criminal corporate settlements, see Office of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Rigged Jus-
tice: 2016: How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy (Jan. 2016), http://
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clays, Credit Suisse, HSBC, JPMorgan, Lloyds, and UBS prosecuted re-
peatedly in a space of just a few years. Just imposing eye-catching cor-
porate fines is not enough to generate lasting accountability.
Now, the DOJ has begun to rethink the evolving corporate prosecu-
tion approach. Professors Elizabeth Joh and Thomas Joo have written a
wonderful essay critically examining the new Yates Memo-the DOJ's
new set of guidelines for individual accountability in corporate crime in-
vestigations-which has been dubbed, in the typical style of the white-
collar bar, after Sally Yates, the Deputy Attorney General who drafted
the memo.3 Joh and Joo question how effective the new DOJ policy shift
will be and "urge greater consideration of complexity" in corporate
prosecutions.' They fear, as I do, that a stilted focus on only individual
accountability might permit excessive leniency to be afforded to corpo-
rations. Fortunately, this policy change is not purely an "all-or-nothing"
change, as I will describe, due to the way in which it interacts with other
aspects of the larger set of corporate charging principles that the DOJ
has already adopted. That is also an additional weakness of the policy
change. It is unclear what a course correction means where, at bottom,
prosecutors simply have discretion to charge corporations-or not-and
settle the corporate cases that are brought through opaque, intensive, and
highly complex negotiations.
Most recently, the DOJ has incorporated the Yates Memo into its
broader set of corporate charging guidelines contained within the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual and made additional changes to those guidelines, in-
cluding setting out the needs for corporate self-reporting and better co-
ordination between federal enforcement agencies that so often work in
tandem.' Those larger changes, while useful, represent an incremental
shift in the overall approach. Perhaps most troubling, the DOJ has not
tightened its criteria for granting leniency in the form of deferred or non-
prosecution agreements to corporations. Nor has the DOJ, despite state-
ments that recidivism will be taken seriously, changed its guidelines to
address the concern that corporations violate agreements and commit
www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/RiggedJustice_2016.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/6LS7-GNWN.
3 Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guide-
lines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 Va. L. Rev. Online 51 (2015).
4 Id. at 54.
'U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.000 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. Attor-
neys' Manual], http://wwwjustice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual, archived at https://
perma.cc/J7C9-6UR3.
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new crimes but still obtain leniency. 6 The DOJ also has not meaningful-
ly addressed the substance of prosecution agreements, from calculation
of fines, to the scope of compliance reforms sought, to the supervision of
the agreements. A deeper rethinking of the federal corporate charging
guidelines is much needed, and the paramount concern with leniency in
corporate prosecutions-to avoid undue collateral consequences-
should instead be directed at individuals.
I. WHY GUIDE CORPORATE CHARGING?
Why do we have federal corporate prosecution guidelines at all? In
few areas of criminal law do prosecutors announce in advance, and in
detail, under what circumstances they will prosecute versus offer out-
right leniency. For years, the DOJ had no specific guidelines, for exam-
ple, on federal drug prosecutions; it was only recently that then-Attorney
General Eric Holder issued guidance on when, for example, to charge
mandatory minimums in drug cases.' The U.S. Attorneys' Manual con-
tains general guidance that pretrial diversion, supervision, and leniency
should be considered for some individuals, noting that "[i]nnovative ap-
proaches are strongly encouraged," but those approaches are rarely used
by U.S. Attorneys, who have extended such pretrial leniency to a tiny
fraction of individuals charged every year.' As federal District Judge
Emmett Sullivan has put it, "people are no less prone to rehabilitation
than corporations."' Instead, for years, particularly under Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft, the DOJ policy was the opposite of lenient, encour-
aging prosecutors to pursue the "most serious, readily provable" charges
6 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1, at 165-68 (describing concerns regarding corporate recid-
ivism).
7 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Department Policy
on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-
department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-
certain-drugcases.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Y7ST-93YH.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual: Criminal Resource Manual § 712, http://
wwwjustice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual, archived at https://perma.cc/WX3Q-5JE7.
Judge Sullivan points out: "Department of Justice statistics indicate that in fiscal year 2012,
there were a total of 253 pretrial diversions for individual defendants, accounting for 0.9% of
the reasons why Assistant United States Attorneys declined to prosecute." United States v.
Saena Tech Corp., Nos. 14-66 (EGS), 14-211 (EGS), 2015 WL 6406266, at *27 (D.D.C.
Oct. 21, 2015) (citations omitted). Judge Sullivan notes also that prejudgment probation is
similarly underused. Id. at *28.
9 Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *29.
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against individuals."o In 2010, these guidelines were moderated to en-
courage pursuit of "the most serious offense that is consistent with the
nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustain-
able conviction," while also encouraging an "individualized assessment"
of the defendant."
Corporations, though, are treated differently. They have never been
prosecuted only for the most serious offenses committed by their agents.
Corporations have long received a separate program of treatment under
the Antitrust Division's highly successful Leniency Program (which af-
fects both corporations and individuals, and which is not affected in its
approach by the Yates Memo). 12 In 1999, then-Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder issued the first DOJ memo providing more general guide-
lines for corporate prosecutions.13 It was a 2003 revision to those guide-
lines, however, that accompanied the modern rise in prosecutions of the
largest and public companies: the "Thompson Memo," named after Lar-
ry Thompson, the Deputy Attorney General who oversaw the revisions,
as I have described elsewhere.14 In the years since the 2003 change, the
DOJ has revised the guidelines-which have been incorporated into the
U.S. Attorneys' Manual as a set of principles for prosecuting organiza-
tions-several more times, responding to concerns regarding attorney-
client privilege and corporate payment of attorneys' fees, as well as con-
cerns regarding the appointment of corporate monitors. The overall
structure of the principles contained in these Principles of Federal Prose-
cution of Business Organizations encouraged consideration of a set of
10 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 5, § 9-27.400; Memorandum from John Ashcroft, At-
torney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Of-
fenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003), http://wwwjustice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag5 16.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/4DF7-884S.
11 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Department Pol-
icy on Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010), http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/
oip/legacy/2014/07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
UXQ2-UAAL.
12 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Leniency Program, http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/lenien
cy-program, archived at https://perma.cc/Q3JK-PJFU.
13 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF, archived at https://perma.cc/G5T7-
ULMM.
14 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv-doj
thomp.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/85RM-NQJK.
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nine factors when deciding whether to pursue an indictment or conviction
of a corporation, or, alternatively, a deferred or non-prosecution agree-
ment. These factors broadly focused on the seriousness of the past con-
duct at the firm, the firm's present cooperation, reporting and compliance
at the firm, and future consequences, including collateral consequences,
for the firm and others should the company be prosecuted.15
Now, those principles have been amended yet again. The most recent
2015 changes add a tenth factor to the set of considerations when charg-
ing organizations. The addition is nothing new, since, to be precise, the
DOJ separated a single prior, confusing factor that considered both co-
operation and self-reporting into two separate factors. 16 To be sure, when
separating cooperation as a factor, the DOJ added a clarification that it is
the firm's cooperation in the investigation of its agents that is the priori-
ty. The new guidelines also contain an entire, prominently displayed sec-
tion announcing the new "focus on individual wrongdoers."17 That sec-
tion details how prosecutions of individuals will be a focus "at every
step of the process," including from the earliest stages of an investiga-
tion. " Moreover, the guidelines now make clear that cooperation is to be
more clearly limited to cooperation in identifying culpable individuals:
"In order for a company to receive any consideration for cooperation
under this section, the company must identify all individuals involved in
or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position,
status or seniority."19 The guidelines also highlight the now separately
noted importance of self-reporting in the form of a "timely and volun-
tary disclosure," which is a truly important change, since corporate
crimes may often go undetected, and corporations in the past had re-
mained unsure as to whether self-reporting crimes would actually be re-
warded.20
However, the revised principles continue to encourage the use of de-
ferred and non-prosecution agreements for corporations, recommending
1s See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.200 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. At-
torneys' Manual (2008 Version)], http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guide
lines.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A58J-72LV.
16 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 5, § 9-28.300 (including, as factor six, "the corpora-
tion's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing," and, as factor four, "the corporation's
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents").
17 Id. § 9-28.210.
Is Id. § 9-28.700(B).
19 Id. § 9-28.700(A).
20 Id. § 9-28.900.
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their use as a middle ground, short of a conviction but not quite a decli-
nation. The principles vaguely note that whether undue collateral conse-
quences of an indictment or conviction recommend such an approach
"must be evaluated in a pragmatic and reasoned way that produces a fair
outcome, taking into consideration, among other things, the Depart-
ment's need to promote and ensure respect for the law." 21 The principles
do say that "prosecutors should generally seek a plea to an appropriate
offense," and also that "generally" this should be a plea to the "most se-
rious, readily provable offense charged." 22 The principles also add a new
section on coordinating parallel proceedings, to encourage closer coop-
eration between prosecutors and those pursuing civil, regulatory, and
administrative actions.23
How important are these sorts of changes to that larger set of corpo-
rate charging principles, given the complexity of the guidelines and the
emphasis on the "substantial latitude" that prosecutors retain in exercis-
ing their discretion?24 One preliminary question is whether the latest
round should even be considered a meaningful set of changes at all. Re-
garding the new stated focus on individual culpability, DOJ policy had
already emphasized for some time that "[oinly rarely should provable
individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it relates to high-
level corporate officers," where the company settles its case with prose-
cutors (since, after all, the company's liability is necessarily premised on
the crimes of its agents).25 Supposedly, individuals were always a central
focus of an investigation. Yet the new additions address an important
practical problem, the subject of my recent article published in this jour-
nal.26 There, I detail how from 2001 to 2014, prosecutors entered 306
deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies, which are
settlement deals permitting the companies to avoid an indictment and a
conviction. Among those companies entering deferred and non-
prosecution agreements, thirty-four percent or 104 companies, had indi-
viduals prosecuted, with 414 total individuals prosecuted to date. Nor
were most of those individuals higher-ups; most were middle manage-
ment. The average sentence, for those who received a sentence with jail
21 Id. § 9-28.1100(B).
22 Id. § 9-28.1500(A), (B).
23 Id. § 1-12.000.
24 Id. § 9-28.200(B).
25 See U.S. Attorneys' Manual (2008 Version), supra note 15, § 9-28.200(B).
26 Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1789 (2015).
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time, was forty months, but over forty percent did not receive any jail
time.27
The new DOJ guidance recognizes, but does not directly address, the
practical challenges of identifying responsible individuals. Individual
wrongdoing will now be a stated focus from the earliest stages, and the
principles now seek to more directly incentivize such cooperation. A
company will only get full cooperation credit for identifying all relevant
individuals. But how will prosecutors know whether a company has
done so, given a position of real dependence on the company's own in-
ternal investigation for information about who did what? It had long
been problematic that corporations could receive credit for cooperation
that, as I have argued, does not remotely resemble the criteria for "sub-
stantial cooperation" for individuals (although the Sentencing Guide-
lines criteria must still themselves be reformed). 28 Nor, as Professors Joh
and Joo describe, 29 does cooperation of the corporation itself necessarily
mean that the most responsible individuals, rather than scapegoated low-
level employees, are identified. Justice is not served if the company
identifies, as Deputy Attorney General Yates put it well, "the vice presi-
dent in charge of going to jail."3 0
The limitations of the new memo extend more broadly, however. The
considerations of prosecutors themselves are multifarious. Even if a
company obtained full cooperation "credit," this would not necessarily
translate to a more lenient outcome. There are other factors to consider.
What if the company's track record of violations was long; would a re-
cidivist really receive leniency for fully cooperating as to its latest viola-
tion? What if the company did not self-report, but only cooperated once it
had been turned in by a competitor? What if the conduct was so reprehen-
sible that prosecutors felt it deserved maximum punishment? After all,
cooperation is only one of the ten factors in the principles. Similarly, self-
reporting in the form of a timely and voluntary disclosure is just another
factor, and while it can be considered "both as an independent factor and
in evaluating the company's overall cooperation and . .. compliance,"
even if a company voluntarily self-discloses, "prosecution may be ap-
propriate" based on "a consideration of all the factors set forth in these
27 Id. at 1791.
28 Id. at 1843-46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 Joh & Joo, supra note 3, at 58.
30 Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Dept. Sets Its Sights on Executives, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 10, 2015, at Al, http://nyti.ms/1UI3xfX.
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Principles."3 1 What if a company is downright non-cooperative or fails
to disclose its crimes? Perhaps such a company could still receive sub-
stantial leniency if other factors weighed in the other direction, such as
self-reporting or collateral consequences to shareholders and employees.
Indeed, there are examples of deferred prosecution agreements that de-
scribe companies as having initially been uncooperative or not disclos-
ing their crimes, but that later garner leniency.
There is no reason that these latest set of changes would produce
greater assurances or greater clarity to corporations. With every revision
and expansion of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual principles, prosecutors still
fundamentally retain broad "all things considered" discretion in corpo-
rate charging. As I have developed in my empirical work on the subject,
what the guidelines say is one thing, and what prosecutors actually do in
practice is another. The guidelines do not say that most public corpora-
tions should receive deferred and non-prosecution agreements, but that
is what has happened in practice. The guidelines do not speak to how
corporate recidivists should be treated, and the relative lack of conse-
quences in practice speaks volumes. Perhaps we need to look at forces
operating largely outside of the DOJ to better understand what occurs in
corporate prosecutions.
II. BEYOND THE PROSECUTORS: CORPORATIONS AND JUDGES
Corporations are not ordinary defendants. A large company may itself
face challenges uncovering who did what, even if it is intent on cooper-
ating. Corporate negotiations with prosecutors are dynamic, to put it
mildly, and the approaches of companies and industries matter. If other
major banks start to receive plea agreements, then obtaining a deferred
prosecution agreement may no longer seem so necessary to preserve a
firm's reputation. The concerns of regulators may play an important role
in negotiations, and often compliance terms and supervision of agree-
ments centrally involve specialist regulatory agencies.
Let us not forget the federal judiciary and its supervisory role. Some
judges have taken on a more active role in reviewing deferred prosecu-
tion agreements before approving them, as well as some plea agree-
ments. I have argued that judges should provide a meaningful review of
the terms of such agreements, given their complexity and public im-
31 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 5, § 9-28.900.
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portance.3 2 In 2013, federal Judge Richard J. Leon rejected a deferred
prosecution agreement with a company for foreign bribery, "looking at
the DPA in its totality" and noting that not only were "no individu-
als . . . being prosecuted for their conduct at issue here," but also "a
number of the employees who were directly involved in the transactions
[we]re being allowed to remain with the company." 33 Soon, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit may rule on appeal whether doing
so was appropriate.
Federal Judge John Gleeson asserted a supervisory power to receive
monitors' reports concerning a deferred prosecution agreement with
HSBC. 34 The DOJ guidelines have long said very little about the entire
subject of supervising compliance and ensuring that a corporation ad-
heres to the terms of a prosecution agreement.
Most recently, Judge Emmett Sullivan suggested that certain factors
(suggested by this author as amicus) could provide "useful guideposts"
when evaluating whether a deferred prosecution agreement with a com-
pany is truly "designed to secure a defendant's reformation" or whether
the terms are "so vague or minimal as to render them a sham." 35 Such
interventions will be of necessity quite deferential where there is no enti-
tlement to receive diversion and where prosecutors reach an agreement
with a defendant, but they may also impact the future contours of corpo-
rate prosecutions, as they have in the past.
III. DOES IT TAKE A PLAN?
Do the breadth of prosecutorial discretion and the multifactored na-
ture of the considerations the DOJ uses when charging a corporation
doom any reform efforts to failure? I think not, but it takes a more com-
prehensive plan of attack to respond to the "too big to jail" challenge of
corporate prosecutions. And, to be fair, the DOJ is continuing to rethink
its approach towards corporations; the Yates memo is not the last word.
32 Garrett, supra note 1, at 282 (arguing that "[]udges should consider the public interest
when reviewing ... deferred prosecution agreements" and "insist on full and open hearings
before approving [such] agreements").
33 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.D.C. 2015).
34 United States v. HSBC, No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
35 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., Nos. 14-66 (EGS), 14-211 (EGS), 2015 WL 6406266,
at *16 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015). I note that this author served as an amicus making recommenda-
tions to the court regarding the question of what standard should be used when deciding wheth-
er to approve a deferred prosecution agreement with a corporation. See id. at *19.
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For example, the Fraud Section at the DOJ has retained a compliance
expert to do a more rigorous job of assessing compliance, since the cor-
poration's "remedial action[s]" and any efforts to implement an effective
corporate compliance program are among the factors to be considered.36
The entire area is evolving so quickly that the DOJ sensibly continues to
adapt and respond to concerns, including those raised by academics, of
all people.
Outside of the DOJ, perhaps, more sweeping solutions can be consid-
ered. I have suggested a broader palette of reforms to address these
problems, both in my book and my recent article on the problem of indi-
vidual prosecutions.37 Legislation is pending in Congress, chiefly fo-
cused on the transparency of the financial terms in civil and criminal
corporate settlements. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has
proposed as part of her presidential campaign a top-to-bottom plan for
policing and preventing corporate crime and financial misconduct.3 8 The
plan carefully addresses systemic risk in financial institutions ("too big
to fail"), but my interest is in "too big to jail" provisions: The plan ad-
dresses a range of concerns that companies and banks, as well as their
officers and employees, can commit massive crimes at great cost to the
public but receive mere slaps on the wrist. Here, I break those relevant
portions of the Clinton plan down into four key recommendations.3 9
1. Corporate deals should not be out of court. I have argued for some
time that non-prosecution agreements simply should not be pursued (alt-
hough the Swiss Banking Program may be the exceptional circumstance
in which such agreements are genuinely useful).40 I have also argued that
36 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ
Fraud Section (Nov. 3, 2015), http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/DN4Z-F87F.
37 See Garrett, supra note 26, at 1839-49 (exploring possible reforms); Garrett, supra note
1, at 273-84.
3 Hillary Clinton: Wall Street Should Work for Main Street [hereinafter Clinton Plan],
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/p/briefing/factsheets/2015/10/08/wall-street-work-for-main-
street, archived at https://perma.cc/9CUX-Y2QU.
'9 I previously outlined these four features of the Clinton Plan in an op-ed. See Brandon L.
Garrett, It Takes a Plan (To End 'Too Big to Jail'), Huffington Post (Oct. 15, 2015), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/brandon-l-garrett/it-takes-a-plan-to-end-too-big-to-jail-b-829614
0.html, archived at https://perma.cc/A6NC-ARH8; Brandon L. Garrett, It Takes a Plan (To End
'Too Big to Jail'), CLS Blue Sky Blog (Oct. 14, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2015/10/14/it-takes-a-plan-to-end-too-big-to-jail/, archived at https://perma.cc/UF9Z-SEH8.
40 In 2010, the United States and Switzerland signed a treaty providing for the exchange of
information on potential tax evaders. The DOJ subsequently announced that it would offer
non-prosecution agreements to Swiss banks that voluntarily disclosed their roles in helping
individuals avoid U.S. taxes. For a more detailed explanation, see Garrett, supra note 1, at
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deferred prosecution agreements have been overused. The DOJ has be-
gun to respond by more often entering plea agreements in the most seri-
ous corporate prosecution cases in practice, but not, as noted, as a matter
of any formal policy change. The DOJ Guidelines should be changed to
reflect the priority of corporate convictions, not just deals. The Clinton
plan criticizes the "overuse" of out-of-court corporate prosecution
agreements and calls for DOJ guidelines clarifying that those agree-
ments should "be used in limited circumstances." 41 The DOJ chose not
to make any such change in its recent round of revisions to its guide-
lines. Corporations should know that they cannot count on out-of-court
leniency deals for the most serious crimes. They should typically be
convicted. (In contrast, I strongly agree with Judge Emmett Sullivan that
we should be thinking far more broadly about deferred and non-
prosecution agreements for individual offenders.) 42
2. Corporate deals should be in the open. We should know what fines
companies are really paying and what is tax deductible or offset through
credits. The Clinton plan endorses the bipartisan transparency in corpo-
rate settlements legislation proposed by Senators Elizabeth Warren and
James Lankford. Some agreements are quite clear on the tax conse-
quences of a settlement. The JP Morgan settlement, for example, includ-
ed $1.7 billion in forfeiture, but stated that the forfeiture was to be treat-
ed as a penalty and that JP Morgan must not see a tax deduction or credit
from that settlement amount.43 Others are more opaque. They often do
not explain any sentencing guidelines calculation for how the fine was
determined, either. The problem also extends to civil settlements, such
as BP's, which have been silent on the question.4 4 Some settlements
have also included set-offs against payments that companies have al-
ready made or have agreed to make to state and local enforcers or feder-
244-45. The DOJ has detailed the Swiss Bank Program and provided materials from each of
the cases on a useful website. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Swiss Bank Program, http://www.
justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program, archived at https://perma.cc/39H9-C6NL.
41 Clinton Plan, supra note 38.
42 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., Nos. 14-66 (EGS), 14-211 (EGS), 2015 WL
6406266, at *21 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015).
43 See Verified Complaint, Exhibit D to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 1-6, United
States v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 14-CR-_ (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/JPMC%20DPA%20Packet%20%
28Fully%20Executed%20w%20Exhibits%29.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H3DE-BQDV;
Garrett, supra note 1, at 124.
44 Garrett, supra note 1, at 135 (noting that, in entering a civil consent decree with BP, the
Environmental Protection Agency did not explain how it reached a penalty of $15 million).
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al agencies. Entire agreements with corporations have been hidden, alt-
hough University of Virginia law students have filed FOIA requests and
successfully obtained many of them.45 The plan says that all such corpo-
rate agreements must be publicly disclosed. The DOJ should be requir-
ing as much on its own. Despite detailed criticism on this front as to the
lenient fines imposed and the failure to calculate them in any transparent
way,4 6 the DOJ did not address the calculation of fines at all in its re-
vised guidelines, and it has never done so except to say that punishment
and deterrence can be accomplished by "substantial fines."47
3. Individuals should be held accountable. As noted, corporations that
receive non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements typically
manage to insulate individuals from prosecution, although they invaria-
bly agree to fully cooperate with prosecutors. When individuals are
charged, they are typically low-level employees, not higher-ups, and
they often do not receive jail time. I have proposed to extend statutes of
limitations in corporate criminal investigations.48 The Clinton plan would
do so for major financial fraud, which may make complex investigations
more practicable.
4. Prosecutors need far more enforcement resources. In corporate
prosecutions, there is a role reversal: The federal prosecutors are the Da-
vid to the defendants, who are the corporate Goliaths of the world. En-
forcers and prosecutors need substantial resources to tackle cases involv-
ing hundreds or thousands of employees at major companies. The Clinton
plan is the first serious plan to bolster enforcement. When the multina-
tional corporation Siemens was investigated in the largest foreign brib-
ery case of its time, the firm cooperated, and in the process, Siemens
spent over a billion dollars hiring attorneys and investigators to represent
it.49 Prosecutors and regulators could move mountains with a fraction of
those resources.
45 Univ. Va. Law Sch., First Amendment Clinic Obtains 18 More of DOJ's Secret Deals with
Corporate Offenders (June 4, 2015), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2015_sum/foia.htm,
archived at https://perma.cc/Z8JL-92JK.
46 See Garrett, supra note 1, at 67-70, 149-50.
47 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 5, § 9-28.1500(B).
48 Garrett, supra note 26, at 1841-42.
49 Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, Forbes (May 28, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/
global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohn-bribery-
racket.html; see also Garrett, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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CONCLUSION
We have long needed a detailed plan of action to revamp our evolving
system of corporate prosecutions, which are very much the envy of the
world corporate enforcement community but which are also still very
much a work in progress. Professors Joo and Joh carefully dissect the
Yates memo and illustrate how limited its impact will likely be, as well
as the potentially perverse consequences of its priorities. It is not alto-
gether clear that it is in fact a new policy. Since their writing, the DOJ
has announced broader changes to its corporate charging guidelines.
These changes are incremental and preserve broad charging discretion
that has not served prosecutors or corporate prosecutions well in the
past. Far more promising changes are possible, and some may be genu-
inely in the works at the DOJ, through legislation, and in plans that may
be adopted by future administrations yet to come. To merely say the fo-
cus will be placed more on individual prosecutions raises practical ques-
tions, including whether this focus will come at the expense of careful
corporate level enforcement. To bolster investigation and enforcement
resources, the DOJ must reorient the entire system by rethinking the
rules for civil disbarment, enhancing civil fines, incentivizing whistle-
blowers better, and strengthening prosecution priorities for the most se-
rious offenders.
We are in the midst of a rethinking of our system of criminal justice
in this country. We are reconsidering our mass incarceration and overly
harsh sentences, with their collateral consequences on entire communi-
ties and generations of young people, and we are focusing on efforts to
promote reentry, rehabilitation, and prevention, rather than punishment.
When one turns to the most privileged offenders in this country, the pic-
ture is reversed. The most far-reaching corporate crimes have received
leniency for years now, as the result of careful thinking and rethinking
of the precise contours of a federal leniency program designed to avoid
excess collateral consequences for corporate offenders. Rehabilitation is
not taken seriously enough, with concerns that compliance may often be
overly cosmetic. Corporate fraud enforcement needs more powerful
teeth. In the years to come, hopefully we will see a reversal of federal
priorities, with new efforts to avoid collateral consequences for individ-
uals committing relatively small offenses, combined with far more rig-
orous prosecution of the largest corporate crimes.
